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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) ("ap-

peals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction
or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony").
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

This is a second appeal in a criminal tax evasion case. Following the Utah

Supreme Court's reversal of their convictions, State v. Steed, 2014 UT 16, 325 P.3d
87, defendants asked the trial court to order return of (1) the fines they had paid;
(2) tax penalties and interest they were ordered to pay as criminal restitution;
(3) costs of incarceration; and (4) supervision fees paid to Adult Probation and
~

Parole. The trial court ordered return of the fines, but refused to order return of
the balance of the monies the Steeds had been required to pay as a result of the
now-overturned convictions.
1.

Where the tax penalties and interest had not been assessed by the

State Tax Commission, and instead were paid solely because of the restitution
order, did due process require their return because reversal of the convictions left
no remaining legal basis for the restitution order? This issue was preserved by
motion at R. 1202-061 . Resolution of this issue turned on a legal, rather than fac-

1

Record references are to the Joan Steed record (081907873). Identical pleadings
were filed in both cases below.

tual, analysis, so de novo review is appropriate. See State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
2.

Does the same due process analysis require return of the incarcera-

tion costs and probation service costs, or may the State retain these monies as

~

fees for services even though they share the same flawed legal source? This issue
was preserved in the same motion cited above, and is subject to the same standard of review.
STATUTES AND RULES

UTAH CODE § 77-38a-301 provides, "'In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make restitution."
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution, provide in pertinent part, "No person ... shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A jury convicted defendants of three counts of failure to file income tax returns, for the years 2003-2005; and acquitted them of all tax evasion counts, and
of failure to file counts for the years 2006 and 2007. Based solely on the three
convictions for failure to file, they were also convicted of a pattern of unlawful
activity.
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The court sentenced Frank Steed to a suspended prison term and 365 days
in jail. It ordered him to pay restitution to the Utah State Tax Commission of
$60,430.12, which included penalties of $24,858.40 and interest of $24,976,72. (F.
;.;J

Steed R. 1334-36.)
The court sentenced Joan Steed to a suspended prison term and 180 days
in jail. It ordered her to pay restitution to the Utah State Tax Commission of

$397,123.50, which included penalties of $55,662.80 and interest of $51,681.23.

(R. 959-61.)

It is significant that these penalties and interest charges were not assessed
by the Tax Commission following the available statutory and adnrinistrative process; rather, they were imposed solely as part of the criminal restitution order.
The time for imposition of penalties and interest by other lawful means has ex~

pired. See UTAH CODE§ 59-1-1410(1).
They day before the criminal charges were filed, the State on October 14,
2008 obtained an order from the court freezing $3,118,997.09 of the Steeds' funds.
The seizure of those funds was the subject of a separate appeal recently decided
by the Utah Supreme Court. State v. Steed, 2015 UT 76. The $302,777.15 in fines
and restitution the court imposed as part of its sentencing orders were taken
from those frozen funds pursuant to order entered May 10, 2011 and were fully
satisfied from that source. (R. 1006-08.) Because the restitution order was imme-
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diately satisfied from the seized funds, no civil judgment of restitution was entered pursuant to UTAH CODE§ 77-38a-401.
Following denial of motions to stay and for certificates of probable cause
by the district court (R. 1084-85) and this Court (August 23, 2011), the Steeds

~

served their terms of incarceration at the Wasatch County Jail. Pursuant to the
pay-to-stay policy of the jail, Mr. Steed paid a total of $18,745 to serve his term at
the Wasatch County Jail. Mrs. Steed paid a total of $11,110 in connection with
her term of incarceration. (R. 1312-13.)
Following their release, Mr. Steed paid Adult Probation and Parole
$1,581.02, and Mrs. Steed paid $1,712, for probation supervision fees. (R. 131516.)
On May 16, 2014, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the convictions and
remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter judgments of acquittal. State v. Steed, 2014 UT 16,

,r 56, 325 P.3d 87.

Following remand, defend-

ants moved the trial court to order refund of "all fines, penalties and interest assessed against them as part of the Court's crim.inal sentence and resulting order
of restitution and all costs associated with their incarceration and probation."

(R. 1202.) The Steeds did not move the trial court to order refund of the principal
amount of taxes they owed and had paid as part of the restitution order, totaling
$149,433.67.

-4-
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The trial court granted the motion in part, ordering that the $145,598 fine
~

the Steeds had paid should be refunded to them. (R. 1386.) The court denied the
motion, however, as it related to the $157,179.15 restitution (penalties and inter-

...;)

est), reasoning that the defendants' tax returns were filed late, and so the State
Tax Commission would have had authority to assess the penalty that was the basis for the restitution order. (R. 1385-86.) The court also declined to return the
$29,855 cost of incarceration in the Wasatch County Jail, deeming it to have been
paid pursuant to a "civil contract entered into by Wasatch County and Defendants." (R. 1386-87.) F:inally, the court declined to return the supervision fees of
$3,293.02 "because such fees are not a deposit within the meaning of Utah Criminal Procedure and because Defendants actually received the State's supervision
services." (R. 1387-88.)2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Due process requires more than just notice and an opportunity to be heard.

It also requires that no person be deprived of liberty or property without a proper legal basis for doing so.

After the notice of appeal was filed, a question arose whether the trial court had
actually entered the required final judgments of acquittal. On March 24, 2015,
this Court entered an Order of Limited Remand directing the trial court to clarify
whether a final order had been entered. In response, the trial court entered an
order on April 23, 2015 that included the final judgments of acquittal as well as
resolution of certain ancillary matters not material to this appeal. (R. 1421-24.)
2
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Here, the legal basis for the trial court's restitution order was UTAH CODE
§ 77-38a-301,

which provides, "In a criminal action, the court may require a con-

victed defendant to make restitution." (Emphasis added.) When the Steeds'
convictions were reversed, the trial court's authority to order restitution evaporated-they were no longer ''convicted defendant[s]."
The trial court sought to preserve its restitution order on the basis that it
represented tax penalties and interest that the Tax Commission could have imposed anyway. This ignores the legal foundation of the order, which was restitution. The Tax Commission did not levy these penalties and mterest pursuant to
its statutory authority, which would have provided the Steeds a forum in which
to challenge them. By imposing the penalties and interest as restitution, the trial
court bypassed that process, but in doing so it irrevocably tied the fate of those
penalties and interest to the fate of the convictions.
The same due process analysis informs the Steeds' other claims for return
of funds. The trial court refused to return incarceration costs and probation fees
on the basis that they had been "voluntary" and that the Steeds had received a
benefit. Those justifications are artificial and circular. They ignore the coercive
context in which the payments were made. The only benefit the Steeds received
was the ability to avoid imprisonment by submitting to the trial court's lesser,
but no less coercive, probation order.

-6-
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It is this coercive context that triggers due process. Where the trial court's
legal authority to coerce the defendants has been eliminated, the consequences of
its coercive orders must be eliminated as well. This requires restoration of all
'{))

funds taken from or paid by the Steeds as a result of the now-reversed convictions.
ARGUMENT

I.

DUE PROCESS REQUIRED THE REFUND OF ALL FINES,
FEES, PENALTIES, AND INTEREST PAID.

There was, and is, no dispute in this case that, with judgments of acquittal
entered in their favor, due process required refund of the fines that the Steeds
paid. The judgments of acquittal deprived the court of the jurisdiction necessary
to support the imposition of those penalties. See State v. Piekkola, 90 S.D. 335,241
N.W.2d 563,564 (1976) ("There is no question that a conviction under an unconstitutional statute is a nullity. There being no legal conviction ... a punishment,
including a fine prescribed by statute, could not lawfully have been imposed."),
u,

overruled on other grounds by Matter of Estate of Erdmann, 447 N.W.2d 356 (S.D.
1989).
Although this fundamental premise was not in dispute, exploration of the
premise's due process underpinnings is warranted because due process informs
analysis of all of the consequences of conviction, not just the penalty imposed in
the form of a fine. The State violates due process when it takes an individual's
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property without a legal basis for doing so. In the present case, the entry of the
judgments of acquittal stripped the State of any legal claim to the property it has
taken from the Steeds. All payments that were required incident to the convictions suffer from the same jurisdictional flaw, and must be returned.
The necessity to refund fines and penalties paid pursuant to an invalid or
reversed conviction has long been recognized. In an early annotation, the right
to refund was said to hinge on whether the payment was voluntary or involun-

tary. See Annotation, Right to recover back fine or penalty paid in criminal proceeding,
26 A.L.R. 1523 (1923). Implicitly, linking the right to recovery to the involuntary
nature of the penalty implicates due process, because the issue is made to tum on
the coercive nature of the deprivation and the authority of the state to impose it.
In United States v. Lewis, 342 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1972), affd, 478 F.2d 835

(5th Cir. 1973), the defendant was convicted of tax evasion under a statute-later

~

held to be unconstitutional under the self-incrimination provision of the Fifth
Amendment-imposing a federal 10 percent excise tax on gambling wagers. After the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the statute, the defendant sought return
of the fine he had paid. The government argued that the payment of the fine had
r.

~

11

been voluntary" because the defendant had entered a guilty plea. The court
disagreed: "This court is inclined to take the view that movants' guilty pleas
were, for the purposes of this motion, less than voluntary; namely, they pleaded
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under the duress of penalties provided by a statute since declared unconstitutional." 342 F. Supp. at 835. Applying a due process analysis, the court held that
return of the fines was required:
The Fifth Amendment prohibition against the taking of one's property without due process of law demands no less than the full restitution of a fine that was levied pursuant to a conviction based on an
unconstitutional law. Fairness and equity compel this result, and a
citizen has the right to expect as much from his government, notwithstanding the fact that the government and the court were proceeding in good faith at the time of prosecution.

Id. at 836.
:~

On appeal in Lewis, the issue was whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider the claim against the government. In affirming the district court,
however, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the monetary consequences of the
conviction had to be set right:
We can see no reason why a person who has paid a fine pursuant to
an unconstitutional statute should be required to resort to a multiplicity of actions in order to obtain reimbursement of money to
which he is entitled. Since the district court was empowered to set
aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the
conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as
fines.

United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir. 1973). Accord, United States v.
idt)

Summa, 362 F. Supp. 1177, 1181 (D. Conn. 1972) (following Lewis); Ex parte
Mccurley, 412 So.2d 1236, 1238 (Ala. 1982) (same).
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Similarly, the Supreme Court of South Dakota in State v. Piekkola, 90 S.D.
335, 241 N.W.2d 563 (1976), pronounced:
Even as the court had the right to set aside Defendant's conviction it
had the right and the duty to set aside the resulting sentence, including the fine and court costs imposed. Once the conviction had been
set aside the state was without a right to collect or retain the fine and
costs and Defendant had a lawful expectation of their return. The
refund was incident to the vacation of the judgment in question.
241 N.W.2d at 564. Accord, People v. Meyerowitz, 61 lli.2d 200, 335 N.E.2d 1, 8
(1975) ("We are of the opinion that the money, having been received in payment
of fines imposed as an incident to judgments of conviction, should be ordered re-

~

funded as an incident to the vacation of the judgments under which it was ordered paid."); Bayer v. Payne, 411 N.W.2d 129, 132 (S.D. 1987) (Henderson, J., dissenting) ("Failing to return a fine and costs collected from any individual pursuant to an unconstitutional conviction, is a violation of the Fifth Amendment.");

cf, State v. Superior Court, 40 P.3d 1239, 1241 (Alaska 2002) (forfeiture of bail
money "denied [the claimant] due process when the court issued an order that
exceeded its statutory powers.").

In the present case, there can be no question that all of the defendants'
payments were involuntary within the meaning of the above line of cases. Defendants were sentenced to indeterminate prison terms of not to exceed five
years. Those sentences were suspended on the condition that they complete the
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jail time the court ordered, pay the fines, pay the restitution, and comply with
supervised probation for a period of six years. (R. 959-61.)
The jurisdictional basis for all of those orders disappeared when the judg~

ments of acquittal were entered. At that point, all coercive consequences of the
acquittals were nullified. As to the fines, the trial court recognized that the taking of defendants' property could no longer be justified. As to the other coercive
consequences of the convictions, however, the trial court believed that they survived the due process challenge. As will be discussed in the next section, that
conclusion was erroneous. The court's jurisdiction to impose coercive consequences derived from the convictions and expired with them. The trial court's
effort to distinguish those consequences ignored the due process underpinnings
of the analysis and was therefore erroneous.
II.

THE RESTITUTION PAID BY THE STEEDS MUST BE REFUNDED.

As part of the judgment of conviction the trial court ordered the Steeds to
viJ

pay restitution, interest on the restitution and penalties associated with the restitution, totaling $457,553.62.

~

That amount comprised $149,433.67 in tax, and

$308.119.95 in penalties and interest. The money was taken from the approximately $3.1 million of the Steeds' funds the State had seized at the commencement of the case. The amount of tax was ascertained in a collaborative process
between the Steeds' accountants and the State Tax Commission, and the Steeds
-11-

did not seek a refund of that portion of the restitution. The Steeds did, however,
request that the penalties and interest that were ordered to be paid as restitution,
$308,119.95, be refunded.
The trial court declined to return the penalties and interest on the basis
that, at the time of the restitution order, the Tax Commission would have had the
statutory authority to assess penalties and interest:
Given Defendants' concession that they had sufficient income
to ·trigger the filing requirement, the Utah State Tax Commission's
statutory authority to charge penalties and interest, the fact that Defendant's tax returns for the 2003-2008 tax years were actually overdue, and the fact that Defendants worked with the Utah State Tax
Commission to agree upon taxes due along with penalties and interest, the Court will not order that the penalties and interest paid to
the Utah State Tax Commission be returned to Defendants. The
Court is confident in this outcome, particularly because the penalties
and interest charged here do not hinge on a criminal conviction; the
penalties and interest charged here could have been charged to any
person who failed to file and pay their taxes on time. As such, this
portion of Defendants' Motion is denied. (R. 1386.)
The trial court was placing its reliance on UTAH CODE§ 59-1-401, which allows the Utah State Tax Commission to charge interest and other penalties for
the underpayment of a tax. But the trial court is not the Tax Commission. The
problem with the coll!t' s reasoning is that, while the Tax Commission may have
had the statutory authority to assess penalties and interest, it did not exercise
that authority. If it had done so, a statutory remedy would have been available
for the Steeds to challenge those levies. By including penalties and interest in the
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restitution order, the trial court was able to bypass that statutory process and deprive the Steeds of the remedies afforded by that process. The quid pro quo of that
decision, however, was that the imposition of penalties rested on the restitution
foundation, not the statutory assessment foundation. Thus, when the court's jurisdiction to impose restitution disappeared, so did the foundation for the assessment.
Due process therefore requires return of the penalties and interest. The
trial court essentially attempted to enforce tax laws using its jurisdiction over a
criminal case where an acquittal has been entered against the defendants. Without a conviction, the trial court lacked legal authority to impose restitution. See
UTAH CODE§

77-38a-301 ("In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted

defendant to make restitution." (emphasis added)). Its attempt to impose restituviJ

ti.on against persons who were not II convicted defendants" exceeded the court's
authority and violated the defendants' due process rights. No authority allows a
court to order restitution from a defendant who has been acquitted of all charges.
III.

THE STEEDS ARE ENTITLED TO A REFUND OF ALL
FEES AND COSTS PAID FOR PROBATION AND INCARCERATION.

A.

Incarceration in Wasatch County.

The Steeds paid $29,855 pursuant to the pay-to-stay policy of the Wasatch
~

County Jail, in order to serve their jail time near their businesses. With work re-
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lease privileges, this facilitated limited maintenance of their business interests
during the time they were deprived of their liberty by the trial court's orders.
The trial court refused to return those funds based on the following rationale:
When the Court sentenced Defendants, it ordered a period of incarceration at the Salt Lake County Jail. Rather than serve their time in
Salt Lake County Jail, Defendants chose to enter into a private contract.with Wasatch County. While the Defendants were required to
serve a period of incarceration, they voluntarily assumed the costs
associated with serving that time in Wasatch County Jail. The Court
concludes that the money paid to Wasatch County was the result of
a civil contract entered into by Wasatch County and Defendants and
was not paid as a fine or restitution in the underlying criminal action
and will not order a refund. (R. 1386-87.)
The trial court's reasoning is similar to the arguments rejected by the court
in Lewis, in which the government argued that the defendant's guilty plea rendered everything that happened thereafter voluntary and consensual.
The Steeds served time at the Wasatch County Jail because the trial court
ordered them to serve a period of incarceration. The Steeds did not want to be
incarcerated. The Steeds did not want to be apart from each other, family and
friends. Th.is was not a voluntary stay as it would have been if they checked into
the Grand America Hotel. Their agreement to pay the costs of incarceration was
extracted pursuant to the coercive power of the convictions, just like the fines
and restitution were extracted from them. The due process underpinnings of defendants' arguments are exactly the same, and the jurisdictional vacuum created
-14-
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by the reversal of those convictions is the same as well. Without the convictions,
no legal basis existed for the court to deprive them of their liberty or their property, and the trial court's efforts to cling to the vestiges of the convictions to justi~

fy retaining the incarceration costs violates due process.

B.

Supervision Fees.

The Steeds paid $3,293.02 in probation supervision fees to the State. Even
thought this was the smallest amount at issue, the trial court spent the most time
analyzing it. The court applied the decision in State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994), which held that fees for rehabilitative services need not be returned when a conviction is vacated. (R. 1387-88.)
In Parker, the defendant was convicted of three counts of burglary and sentenced to one to fifteen years in prison. 872 P.2d at 1042. The prison sentence
~

was stayed and the defendant placed on probation, on condition that he pay a fine and attend the Fremont Center where he paid a monthly fee to participate in a
rehabilitation program. Id. at 1043. The Fremont Center is a state-run halfway
house that offers individuals on probation a place to live and treatment programs.
The conviction was reversed on appeal because the evidence used to convict was obtained in an unconstitutional arrest. The defendant sought return of
the fine and Fremont Center fees. The trial court ordered refund of the fine, but
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not the fees. On appeal, the court of appeals unanimously held that the court
had jurisdiction over the claim, but fractured three ways on the return of the fees.
Judge Billings would have returned the fees on due process grounds, holding
that the requirement to pay those fees had been an incident of conviction, and

~

that the stay in the halfway house had a punitive as well as a rehabilitative component. Id. at 1047. She reasoned that the requirement to pay the fee was no different than the fine-the defendant was required to pay it as a part of his probation, and although he could have chosen to go to prison, that did not make the
choice voluntary. Id.
Judge Davis approached the case from the standpoint of UTAH R. CRIM. P.
28(a), which provides: "If a judgment of conviction is reversed ... any deposit of
funds or property [must be] refunded to the proper person." He concluded that
the rule "does not provide for the return of fees for rehabilitative services." Id.
He rejected Judge Billings' due process analysis, concluding that the fees were
rehabilitative rather than· punitive, and that the defendant had received a benefit.
He felt that due process had been satisfied because the defendant had been "given notice and a hearing before being deprived of his property rights." Id. at 1050.
Judge Greenwood agreed with Judge Davis that a benefit had been conferred. She disagreed with his due process analysis. She rejected his "notice and
a hearing" due process analysis and agreed with Judge Billings' approach, but

-16-
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11

concluded that due process fairness" did not mandate return of the fees because
"defendant received something in exchange for his payment." Id. at 1050-51.
It is not easy to generalize any conclusions from those opinions. It would
appear that two judges agreed that due process is implicated and that it is more
than a procedural requirement, but there was no agreement as to how it should
be applied. Two judges agreed that "benefit" should be considered, although for
different reasons, with only one seeing benefit as part of the due process analysis.
The Parker case does seem to stand for the proposition that due process
does not permit the State to retain money coercively obtained from a defendant,
even in the context of probation, with the limited exception of money obtained in
exchange for a benefit. Applying such an analysis in the case at bar would require return of the penalties paid in the form of restitution, because no benefit
Vi/9

was received.
Even as to the other categories of payments at issue in this case, it would
seem that Parker supports refund. Unlike the treatment the defendant in Parker
received, the Steeds received no treatment. Nothing about what happened to
them can be characterized as a "benefit" in the sense of the judges in the case.
Judge Davis relied in part on the proposition that "[t]he purposes of probation
are 'reform and rehabilitation' rather than punishment." Id. at 1049. The Steeds'
probation, however, was clearly punitive: they were required to serve periods of
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incarceration which were not therapeutic. While the Steeds paid to serve their
time in Wasatch County rather than Salt Lake County, the whole scenario unfolded in the same coercive context as the other penalties. This is no different
from the conclusions of Judges Billings and Greenwood in Parker that payment
was incident to the conviction.
The costs of supervision were also neither voluntary nor therapeutic. The
defendants received no benefit other than an ability to partially mitigate the effects of the court's sentence, just like the defendant in Parker who also complied
with the terms of probation in order to avoid a more severe punishment.
After reviewing the Lewis case and the other cases bearing upon the issue,
Judge Billings described the applicable standard in a way that the Steeds believe
should be adopted by the full court:
Not only does the Fifth Amendment require notice and a hearing,
but it requires that the state not deprive citizens of their propertyhere fees paid incident to a conviction - without a valid legal basis.
In the present case, the legal basis for the payment of the fees is no
longer tenable: defendant's conviction has been vacated. Thus, the
State violates due process when it takes defendant's property once
its legal basis for doing so is gone.

Id. at 1048.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants request that this Court reverse the
trial court's judgment insofar as it refused to refund the restitution, incarceration

-18-

~

costs, and supervision fees that were imposed as a consequence of the convictions.
DATED this ~ y of September, 2015.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By~
Rodney R. ~arker

Attorneys for Appellants
C:\NRPORTBL\IDOCS\RRP\3306922...1.00CX.-9/28/15
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ADDENDUM

Ruling & Order, October 7, 2014 (R. 1384-89)
@

@

@

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-·-·--- ·-····- ..... -·········· __ ......... -................ ..
,,,

,

_.,_,,,

..... ·····----•--........ ---··-·····-.

Plainti~
vs.
Judge Robin Rees

FRANK J. STEED,
JOAN A. STEED,
Defendants.

Before the Court is Defendants Frank J. Steed ("Mr. Steed'1 and Joan
---------,Steecl!s-(~sr-Steed~.colle~ti:v.el~'D.efendan~-Motion..to_Omer_as_~art_of~-o=-=en,,,.,.___ _ _ _ _ __

of Acquittal the Refund of Fines, Penalties, Interest, and Costs Associated wi
Incarceration and Probation ("Motion"). The Court has reviewed the moving, opposition,
and reply papers. No hearing was requested. Having considered the briefing,

e Court

now roles as follows.
BACKGROUND

On September 17, 2010, Defendants were convicted of three counts o Failure to
Render a Proper Tax Return and one count of Pattern of Unlawful Behavior. he Court
sentenced Defendants on April 22, 2011. Mr. Steed's sentence required him · serve a

365-day jail sentence in the Salt Lake County Jail. Ms. Steed's sentence requ ed her to
serve 180 days in jail. In addition to jail time, the Court ordered that Mr. Ste

pay

restitution which included $24,858.40 in penalties and $24,976.72 in interest and ordered
that Ms. Steed pay restitution which included $55,662.80 in penalties and $5 ,681.23 in

interest The total amount of penalties and interest that the Steeds were order d to pay
was $157,179.15. The Court also ordered Mr. Steed to pay of fine of $5,300
Ms. Steed to pay a fine of $140,298. The total amount of penalties, interest,
the Steeds were ordered to pay was $302,777.15.

d ordered

Following the sentencing hearing and after the commencement of his j il time,
Mr. Steed filed a motion requesting that he be allowed to serve the remainder f his
sentence in Wasatch County Jail. The Court granted Mr. Steed's motion and o derecl, on

...................................... )ui~l8·~·20U~ 'thafMl· ··stee~IialL............ ····-a·b............. ··such conditionn~on
contract of confinement by and between he and Wasatch County, including
costs, work release conditions and any all such costs and conditions of confine ent and
release imposed by Wasatch County." On October 25, 2011, Ms. Ste~d filed a imilar
motion requesting that she be able to seive her jail sentence in Wasatch Coun . The
Court also granted that motion pursuant to the tenns of the contract of confine
between Ms. Steed and Wasatch County. In total, for their jail time served, the
paid Wasatch County Jail $29,855. Additionally, while on probation, Mr. Stee paid
$1,581.02 and Ms. Steed paid $1,712 for their supervision fees for a total of$3 93.02.
The total paid by Defendants in restitution, fines, and fees amounts to
-------'$33-S,9~d-=7-.-Gn-May-16,201-4,the-lJtah-Supr.eme-Court:..issued..an...order.i:eqlliipn:gg_.t11thiwsL___ _ _ _ _ __
0

Court to enter an acquittal for Defendants.
~

DISCUSSION
Given the Utah Supreme Court's order, Defendants' Motion requests th
Court order, as part of the Judgment of Acquittal, that the Utah State Tax Co

the Utah State Deparbnent of Corrections, the Wasatch County Sheriff's Offic
Adult Probation & Parole refund to Defendants all penalties, interest, fines, an
fees assessed against them as part of their criminal sentence, order of restitutio ,
incarceration, and probation plus interest at the legal rate.
A. Utah State Tax Commission

Defendants paid, as part of the order of restitution, $157,179.15 in pen
interest to the Utah State Tax Commission. Defendants contend that this amo
be returned to them because the penalties and interest were ordered as part of th now

vacated judgment of conviction. The State argues that Defendants are not entitl d to
a refund of this amount because there is no question that Defendants failed to
returns for the years of 2003-2008 (in fact, Defendants conceded "that they had
.

.

e tax
cient

income [each year] to trigger the filing requirement," Sta.te v. Steed, 2014 UT 1 ., 112325
P.3d 87) and because the Tax Commission has the statutory authority to charge
2

~

1385

and interest to any person who fails to file and pay their taxes.
Given Defendants' concession that they bad sufficient income to trigg
requirement, the Utah State Tax Commission's statutory authority to charge p
~

_ _ _ _
· . . · _.·._ . . . ._ . .
-

. -~.-~-~-~--~-·~-.-~--~-~~

n1
. . ·~·-·-~-·•..m;,J··thtg·~cfnfaciQ-·tuttbh~atU·D~e~'fe~n~d~an~t~·ts~·tax~·
·g..r~etums~~-1foQ!rjth~e~·2~0~0~3-~·2:Q:00~8~. tax~·1e~ars~·w~ere~·~~!¥~

. . ..
1.·

overdue, and the fact that Defendants worked with the Utah State Tax Commis ion to
agree upon taxes due along with penalties and interest, the Court will not order

the

penalties and interest paid to the Utah State Tax Commission be returned to D endants.
The Court is confident in this outcome, particularly because the penalties and · terest

charged here do not hinge on a criminal conviction; the penalties and interest c
here could have been charged to any person who failed to file and pay their tax
As such, this portion of Defendants' Motion is denied.
B. Utah State Department of Corrections
At sentencing, Defendants were fined in the amount of $145,598. That

------was-taken-frem-the-Stceds!-fr.ozen-accounts.hy_the..S.tate..and..paid to the Dq2==;==:.=,____ _ _ _ _ _ __
of Corrections. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 28(a) explains that "if a ju
conviction is reversed ... any deposit of funds or property [must be] refunded t
proper person." The Utah Court of Appeals has held that reimbursement is r
fines and smcharges which arose as incidents of conviction. State v. Parker., 87
1041, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1994}. Given Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 28(a and the
determination made by the Utah Court of Appeals., the Court concludes that the

es paid

by defendants must be returned. As such, as part of the Judgment of Acquittal., tab State
Department of Corrections is hereby ordered to refund $145,598 plus interest at
rate to Defendants.
C. Wasatch County Sheriff's Office

Defendants request that the Court issue aii order requiring the Wasatch
Sheriff's Office to refund the money it was paid by Defendants during their resp ctive
terms of incarceration. The Court respectfully denies Defendants' request. Whe the
Court sentenced Defendants, it ordered a period of incarceration at the Salt Lake County
Jail. Rather than serve their time in Salt Lake County Jail, Defendants chose to

a private contract with Wasatch County. While the Defendants were•required to
a period of incarceration, they voluntarily assumed the costs associated with s
3

g

that time in Wasatch County Jail. The Court concludes that the m~ney paid to

asatch

County was the result of a civil contract entered into by Wasatch County and
··-·

........... .

and was not paid as a fine or restitution in the underlying criminal action and

-----···_···_···_l--ow·i.U,l·a~mn: . ···············. ·. ·-·--·--······ ....· · · · ·----------·--·--..--- .......................... ·................................................ ··· · ·........................ ·
......

D. Adult Probation and Parole

Lastly, Defendants seek a refund of the fees they paid to Adult Probatio
Parole. In State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah Ct App. 1994), the Utah Court
Appeals examined the requirements of Rule 28 of the Utah Rules of Criminal P ocedure.
Rule 28 provides:
If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless o erwise
specified by the appellate court. Pending a new trial or other proceeding, the

defendant shall be detained, or released upon bail, or otherwise restricte as the
trial court on remand determines proper. If no further trial or proceeding to be
had a defendant in custody shall be discharged, and a defendant restricte by bail
· shall be released from restriction and bail exonerated and
deposit
of funds or property refunded to the proper person.
Utah R. Crim. P. 28(a). The Court of Appeals, seeking to provide an interpretati n
of"any deposit of funds or property [to be] refunded to the proper person," loo~
Black's Law Dictionary for the definition of"deposit." Id. at 1049. Black's de
deposit as:
A bailment of goods to be kept by the bailee without reward, and deliv~
according to the object or purpose of the original trust. In general, an act y which
a person receives the property of another, binding himself to preserve it d return
it in kind The delivery of chattels by one person to another to keep for th use of
the bailor....
·

Money placed with a person as an e~est or security for the performance
contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his [or her] undertaking.

Given this definition, the Court of Appeals concluded that, although Rule 28 pro
for the return. of bail and deposits when a conviction is vacated, it does not provid for
the return of fees for rehabilitative services. Id. In State v. Walker, the Idaho Co

of

Appeals examined the Utah Court of Appeals' conclusions in State v. Parker. Th e,
the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that "requiring the payment of fees to defray co

of

supervision on probation, if possible to perform, is reasonable and has a rehabilita: ·ve
4

·..

!

effect'' and held that, even though a defendant's conviction was set aside, the d fendant
was not entitled to a refund of supervision fees. State v. Walker, 887 P.2d 53, 5
App. 1994).

. . ···-·· ..............Gh~n~~clusfonsby.botb tbeUtabT'ii1iff0fk·····----·· -··ana·thtfldano·
of Appeals, this Court concludes that it would be inappropriate to refund the fl s paid
by Defendants to Adult Probation and Parole because such fees are not a depos within

the meaning of Utah Criminal Procedure and because Defendants actually recei ed the
State's supervision services.

ORDER
Based on the forgoing, and for good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY O

BRED

that Defendants'· Motion is GRATED in part and DENIED in part consistent wi
Ruling above.

This Ruling and Order is the final order of the court, and no additional o der is

equired-to-be-prepared-in-this-~r..-------------+-------DATED this _2_ day of October, 2014.
DISTRICT COURT JUDG

5
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